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Abstract 
Digital image steganography is a method for hiding secret messages within everyday Internet communication 
channels. Such covert communications provide protection for communications and exploit the opportunities 
available in digital media. Digital image steganography makes the nature and content of a message invisible to 
other users by taking ordinary internet artefacts and using them as cover objects for the messages. In this paper 
we demonstrate the capability with raster image files and discuss the challenges of detecting such covert 
communications.  The contribution of the research is community awareness of covert communication capability 
in digital media and the motivation for including such checks in any investigatory analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Steganography dates back in recorded history and is translated as covered writing; ‘Steganos’ meaning covered, 
and ‘Graphy’ writing (Shih & Edupuganti, 2009). Steganography has taken many forms from invisible ink, 
microdots, through to covert channels in digital media. The primary goal of steganography is to hide a message 
in plain sight, and as such messages are sent via a non-suspicious medium with the hidden message concealed 
within where only the sender and receiver should be aware of the presence of hidden information. Whilst the 
goal of Steganography and Cryptography are essentially to securely store, or send information from point a to 
point b, these methods contrast fundamentally. The arguably more well-known art and science of Cryptography 
achieves this goal by performing an operation on the data to render it illegible to eavesdroppers, and in essence 
by a process of either transposition, substitution or a combination. The contrast between cryptography and 
Steganography lies in the fact that cryptography makes no attempt to hide a secret communication, whilst 
Steganography hides the existence. Essentially, this means that in cryptography scenarios eavesdroppers are 
attracted to the secret communication, whilst such messages in Steganography scenarios must be disclosed. 
 
Every cryptographic, information hiding scheme is theoretically susceptible to attack. It is common knowledge 
that the opposing side of cryptography is cryptanalysis that uses methods to decrypt an encrypted message. 
Synonymously, Steganalysis is the art and science of detecting and uncovering a steganographic payload. Any 
steganographic system is said to be broken simply if it the very existence of the payload is detected, this is 
regardless of whether the actual message is understood (Cogranne, Zitzmann, Fillatre, Retraint, Nikiforov, & 
Cornu, 2011). In our research we simply want to demonstrate the capability for covert communications in the 
media and then to suggest ways to detect steganography. The implication of this research are for both legitimate 
and illegitimate uses of the technology but principally community awareness. The paper begins with a 
background literature review, and elaboration of research problem areas, a demonstration of the iSteg tool for 
embedding covert messages and the detection of such messages. The concluding discussion reviews the 
importance for awareness of covert communication capability in digital media and the necessity of including 
such checks in any digital investigation.  
 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
Theoretically, the sending and storing of secret information is achievable in any digital computer generated file. 
However it is shown that the embedding of secret information is best suited to digital media (Singh & Siddiqui, 
2012). This is because digital media files such as audio, images, and video contain a large amount of redundant 
information. Redundant in the sense that many of the frequencies used to render information in such files are in 
actuality, invisible or in audible to the human senses, as they are out of the ranges detectable by human senses. 
This is demonstrated in digital images whereby the noisy areas or areas in an image with more variation or 
texture have a higher rate of colour changes can be used to exploit imperceptibly and hide information. In raster 
format images the opportunity is greater because there are more combination of colour scales to use and to 
manipulate for message hiding (Varsaki, Fotopoulos & Skodras, 2013). Two characteristics are of primary 
concern when hiding messages, the level of imperceptibility, and payload size (Li, Luo, Li & Fang, 2009). For 
any steganographic system to be successful, the two requirements must be satisfied. The researcher challenge is 
that there is a trade-off between these two characteristics, as the embedded messages size increases, the more the 
cover medium will degrade. Consequently when using covert channels in raster images the trade-off may be 
satisfied in several ways. Raster images are computer generated images which are composed of individual pixel 
elements. Each pixel defines the colour composition at each location in a grid like fashion and are the elemental 
building blocks for the digital images. Each pixel is in essence, a stored value representing the value of Red, 
Green, and Blue (RGB) as a ratio for every colour in the human visible spectrum that may be represented as a 
ratio of RGB. This ratio is then interpreted by the computer based on the image file format to render the image 
on the screen. Hiding information is possible in one of three methods: 1. the naïve method whereby secret 
information is hidden at the end of the file; 2. spatial methods using the Least Significant Bit (LSB) method, 
secret information is hidden in the LSB of selected pixels; and 3. Frequency domain, where images are 
transformed to other representative domains and information is hidden by modification of this frequency 
representation (Chang, Chen, & Lin, 2009). 
 
Digital image steganography is achieved by two fundamentally differing methods: 1. In the Spatial Domain, and 
2. In the Transform domain. In the spatial domain the digital image is a grid or matrix of M x N pixel elements, 
and each element is considered as a building block for the human visual impression. The individual pixel 
elements can be directly modified in such a way as to conceal hidden information. Whereas in the transform 
domain, the entire image is transformed to a frequency representation of the colour values of the image 
(Hemalatha, Acharya, Renuka, & Kamath, 2012). Here the frequencies can be modified in such a way as to 
conceal hidden information. The two methods are consequently helpful for covert communications and both 
must be checked in investigatory analysis. There a number of spatial methods and we use the LSB method that 
exploits the Human Visual System (HVS) as an example. Less distortion is created by embedding in the LSB 
and the colour degrades less by inserting a Most Significant Bit (MSB) (Liao, Wen, & Zhang, 2011).  The LSB 
method considers the least significant bit plane shown in Figure 1.  (Sun, Li, Zhong, &  Li, 2012). The colour 
coded bit is the covert message. 
 Pixel 1 Pixel 2  Pixel 3 
R 1001010  1 00011011 11000111 
G 01101001    10110111  
B    
 
 
                           
        R         
        G       
        B 11001010           11010100      10100011 
 
Figure 1. Least significant bit plane of three pixels 
 
In figure 2 the code of figure 1 is represented in the specified colours as a human visual representation. The 
encoded message is not visible to the human eye (HVS). 
  
  
 
Figure 2. Resulting pixels from the pixel values 
 
As there are 8 bits per Byte we may hide one Byte into these three pixels. For illustration if we take the letter A, 
converted to binary is 01000001. This is embedded in the LSB by literally replacing the LSB plane with this 
new value shown in Figure 3. Thus, it takes three bits to hide one character. 
 
Pixel 1  Pixel 2  Pixel 3 
        R 10010100 00011010      11000110 
        G 01101001 10110110      10101011 
        B 11001010           11010100      10100011 
 
 Figure 3. Least significant bit plane 
 
 
Shown in Figure 4 the resulting pixel colours are imperceptible to the HVS and this is the strength of LSB 
steganography. Information hiding in the LSB method is very simple to achieve and has a high level of 
imperceptibility. 
                  
 
 
Figure 4. Resulting colours after embedding 
 
The selection of pixels is not trivial and the selection is either based on a random key generation dispersing the 
hidden messages pseudo randomly, or based on the characteristics of the image such as the exploitation of the 
HVS by using intelligent techniques to identify the noisy sections of an image that can hold data securely 
without being noticed (Li, Luo, Li, & Fang, 2009). 
 
DETECTING COVERT COMMUNICATIONS 
 
The question arises as to how these simple methods of covert communication may be detected. Steganalysis is 
the art and science of uncovering Steganographic payloads, and is synonymous to the more well-known concept 
of Cryptanalysis. Any steganographic system is broken as soon as the presence of a Steganographic payload is 
detected, and the actual payload does not need to be extracted to be considered broken (Bohme, 2008). This is 
because various attacks may be performed on the media in order to render the hidden information 
unrecoverable, such as resizing, cropping and various other attacks which modify the image contents destroying 
any hidden messages (Kodovsky, & Fridrich, 2013). The primary objective is to hide information in plain sight 
so that the message is in fact invisible. In this case, therefore, clearly the uncovering of the existence of an 
underlying message defeats the primary purpose. Once Steganography is detected, attacks can be made to hinder 
communication and in this way the message is destroyed. Steganalysis may be performed by simple naïve 
approaches such as side by side comparison between original image and suspected Steganographic image. Side 
by side comparison may first begin by a visual comparison, where certain tell-tale signs occur as detected from 
particular Steganographic techniques, such as blockiness, areas with uncharacteristic deviations in contrast. Side 
by side comparisons may also consist of file size, inconsistencies and calculated pixel value histograms. 
However, the sophisticated algorithms being developed provide highly imperceptible differences to both the 
HVS and to computer assisted comparisons, and as such more sophisticated Steganalysis techniques require 
development. 
 
There are two primary branches of advanced Steganalysis techniques: 1. Blind attack methods, and 2. Targeted 
attack methods. Both blind and targeted attack methods are achieved by comparing suspected images against 
known resulting statistical anomalies typical of modification by Steganographic methods; and, those which 
deviate past a given threshold are deemed to carry a payload. Blind methods are used to simply detect the 
presence of a steganographic payload potentially from any Steganographic technique (Hashemipour, & 
Mohammad Rahmati, 2012), however, blind attacks may be tailored for a particular file type such as JPEG (Yu, 
2012). Whereas, targeted attacks are attacks targeted towards known specific Steganographic methods and 
techniques (Tan, 2012). There is a trade-off between using blind and targeted methods, targeted methods are 
more robust in instances where the Steganographic technique used is not known, or whether there is any 
Steganographic payload at all. Whereas, targeted attacks will typically be tailored for a specific Steganographic 
technique, and as such will not detect payloads which are created with different methods. To graphically 
demonstrate these points a hypothetical case can be developed regarding information leakage from a business or 
the command and control communications of a terror cell. Applying the fundamentals of spatial image 
Steganographic techniques and specifically the LSB method. The least significant bit of each selected pixel is 
replaced with one of the message. To this end the industry outguess tool is used to embed a small text file of 
hypothetical secret instructions called instructions.txt at 5KB in size into Lena.jpg having a resolution of 
512x512 pixels in Figure 5 (a). 
 
  
Figure 5 (a) Lena image before embedding process, (b) Lena image after embedding process. 
 
Traditionally Steganalysis is performed by conducting a side by side analysis or comparison of the suspected 
Steganographic image with that of the original image, making note of any discrepancies. A primary mechanism 
used in any digital image analysis and processing field is the image histogram which represents the frequency of 
each colour in the image, the image histogram is used as a key mechanism to computationally describe the 
image. From the resulting histogram many numerical measurements may be calculated and derived to both 
analyse the large array of data giving a more succinct analysis than human eyes alone, but also allowing the 
automation of comparison. 
 
A common practice is to average the RGB channels to obtain an intensity image by  I = (R + G + B) / 3, the 
average gives an approximation. The ratio or weightings of the R, G, and B channels may be adjusted for 
accuracy, for simplicity of this demonstration the weightings are equal. If the intensity images is taken of both 
the cover image of Lena.jpg Figure 5 (a), and the Stego image Covert.jpg Figure 5 (a) shown in Figure 6 (a) and 
Figure 6 (b) respectively we can see slight differences in the shape that the HVS whereas the HVS Figure 5 (a) 
and Figure 5 (b) are indistinguishable from one another. 
 
 
Figure 6 (a) Lena image before embedding process, (b) Lena image after embedding process. 
 
The outguess tool is intelligent in the sense that care is taken to estimate the most unnoticeable areas to embed 
within. By comparing the two images alone we are unable to distinguish one from the other, however by 
comparing the resulting histograms side by side there are some slight visual differences. Particularly, there are 
areas in the stego image histogram which has been smoothed from around the gray levels near 50. We can also 
see the higher frequency range has been shortened from around 248 to around 240 indicating that an even spread 
of embedding in light to dark areas has occurred and this fits with the idea that more advanced algorithms 
embed in the areas where there is a transition from light to dark. Such a histogram gives an entry point into the 
conclusion as to whether there exists a steganographic payload. More advanced analysis techniques may also be 
performed by performing histogram shape descriptors and typical statistic anomalies. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Figures 1 to 4 have demonstrated the simplicity and imperceptibility of embedding covert messages into a raster 
file. Imperceptibility to the HVS does not imply Stegananlysis fails. As we have shown in figure 5 (b) statistical 
analysis of the image discloses the payload of the embedded files. The mapping of anomalies from one image to 
another using a variety of tools and approaches that include orchestrated attacks for zero difference assessments, 
can disclose hidden messages. The implications of the demonstration are twofold. One is that the community of 
researchers and practitioners are alerted to the fact that covert communications are easy to do and to deliver 
through most Internet media. Secondly we show the direction Stegananlysis may go for further development. 
Tools and tool development are crucial in opening digital media for Steganographic scrutiny and a direction 
researchers may move in.  
 
The detection of hidden messages is necessary in the fight against the distribution of dangerous material and 
unlawful activities, and it may also provide useful intelligence leading to further investigation. In terms of 
information warfare disclosure is as good as decryption. A key advantage in being able to decipher and extract 
such payloads provides law enforcement, and intelligence agencies with a stronger repertoire in the penetration 
of unlawful networks. For example, if two use case illustrations were used to elaborate the detection of covert 
channels in raster images, one from the corporate domain and another from the protection of public interest. 
Firstly, consider the scenario whereby an employee whom is contracted to work for company A on developing a 
ground-breaking new technology, the employee in question is approached company B and offered a 
considerable sum of money to provide inside information enabling an unfair technical advantage through 
reverse engineering. Company A stands to lose out on considerable financial gain for their effort should 
company B be provided with such information, Steganographic images may be used to provide company B with 
the desired information, and it would go unnoticed as only the employee and company B are aware of the 
presence of hidden information. This scenario has been popularised in a number of feature films over recent 
decades, and is by no means a fictional problem rather a definite reality. 
 
Secondly, consider a scenario in the public domain that has received varying levels of media attention in recent 
decades. The exchange of two forms if illegal information: 1. The exchange of questionable images and 
information in conjunction with human trafficking, and 2. The exchange of anti-state information leading to the 
very real possibility of commands and directions directly leading to the harm and injury of innocent person(s). 
Steganography is both useful for legitimate purposes in protecting media and personal privacy, however 
unfortunately illegitimate and questionable uses are equally likely and are indeed a real and present threat. By 
utilising Steganalysis methods to detect Steganographic payloads company A may be able to improve the 
security intelligence posture by actively detecting possible leaks of top secret intellectual trade secrets. 
Similarly, state intelligence agencies, law enforcement, military and similar agencies may utilise Steganalysis 
techniques on key known targets in order to thwart future harm through, abuse, trafficking or terror attacks. 
Clearly, the legitimate use of steganography has benefits in protecting privacy and media, whilst Steganalysis 
protects privacy by addressing the exchange of questionable and illegal information. Clearly, there are both 
benefits and ill effects of both Steganographic methods and Steganalysis methods. The adoption of methods 
defined by the context in which such techniques are applied and for which it is within legitimate and lawful use. 
Steganography may be used for legitimate reasons, to protect personal privacy and protect intellectual property 
such as copyrighted material. Similarly, Steganography may be used for questionable and illegal purposes such 
as stealing, hiding, and transmitting of information such as trade secrets. Steganography may also be used to 
hide, and transmit questionable images and information or instructions leading to the harm of innocent 
person(s). 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The human visual system may be exploited using Steganographic techniques to hide hidden information. This 
may provide covert channels for communications, for protecting privacy and providing property security. The 
research focus was on raster images but any digital medial may carry covert communications, such as digital 
audio, game files, video, and potentially any other digital computer generated file. Covert communication 
unfortunately whilst it has benefits for protecting privacy and giving secure communications, it may also be 
used for unethical and unlawful purposes. As such it is necessary to be aware of techniques and tools that may 
assure adequate detection and correct usage of the digital opportunities. We have demonstrated for the purpose 
of community awareness the embedding techniques, the detection processes and the existence of the covert 
communication channel. 
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